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Abstract
There have been three influenza pandemics since the 1900s, of which the 1919–1919 flu pandemic
had the highest mortality rates. The influenza virus infects both humans and birds, and mutates
using two mechanisms: antigenic drift and antigenic shift. Currently, the H5N1 avian flu virus is
limited to outbreaks among poultry and persons in direct contact to infected poultry, but the
mortality rate among infected humans is high. Avian influenza (AI) is endemic in Asia as a result of
unregulated poultry rearing in rural areas. Such birds often live in close proximity to humans and
this increases the chance of genetic re-assortment between avian and human influenza viruses
which may produce a mutant strain that is easily transmitted between humans. Once this happens,
a global pandemic is likely. Unlike SARS, a person with influenza infection is contagious before the
onset of case-defining symptoms which limits the effectiveness of case isolation as a control
strategy. Researchers have shown that carefully orchestrated of public health measures could
potentially limit the spread of an AI pandemic if implemented soon after the first cases appear. To
successfully contain and control an AI pandemic, both national and global strategies are needed.
National strategies include source surveillance and control, adequate stockpiles of anti-viral agents,
timely production of flu vaccines and healthcare system readiness. Global strategies such as early
integrated response, curbing the disease outbreak at source, utilization of global resources,
continuing research and open communication are also critical.
Background
Since the 1700s, there have been ten to thirteen influenza
outbreaks or probable pandemics, of which three have
occurred since the beginning of the 20th  century: the
1918–1919 Spanish flu pandemic, the 1957–1958 Asian
flu pandemic and the 1968–1969 Hong Kong flu pan-
demic [1]. Of the three pandemics, the 1918–1919 pan-
demic was the most severe. The 1918–1919 strain of
influenza was unusual because of the high rate of mortal-
ity among victims between the ages of 15 and 35 years.
Deaths from influenza are usually due to secondary bacte-
rial infection but many deaths during the 1918–1919
pandemic were caused directly by the virus itself. It
appears that the immune system in young persons para-
doxically went into over-drive while battling the influenza
virus and progressed into an immunologic storm that
killed the victims [2]. This was in contrast to the pandem-
ics of 1957–1958 and 1968–1969 which were much
milder. There were several reasons for this: the influenza
strains were less virulent, the patterns of mortality were
more typical of a usual seasonal influenza outbreak (i.e. it
was concentrated among the very young and very old) and
doctors were able to use antibiotics to treat secondary bac-
terial infections. The Attack Rate is the percentage of the
population that becomes ill from an infection while case
fatality rate refers to the percentage of infected people who
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die from the infection. Experts generally agree that the
attack rates of the past 3 influenza outbreaks in the last
century did not differ markedly and is estimated to be
25% to 30%. Using similar evidence, experts estimate the
case fatality rate during the 1918 outbreak to be about
2.5% whereas the case fatality rates during the 1957–1958
and 1968–1969 episodes were below 0.2% [3].
The genes of the influenza virus can mutate in 2 main
ways: (1) antigenic drift which involves small errors being
incorporated into a virus gene sequence when the virus
makes copies of itself and (2) antigenic shift involving an
exchange of genes between two types of viruses (e.g.
between avian and human forms of influenza virus) when
both viruses are present in the same animal or human [4].
As a result of these mutations, the influenza virus changes
its protein coat (antigens) and allows them to find new
susceptible non-immune populations to infect. Both
mechanisms of genetic mutation have the possibility of
producing a new virus that can be easily transmitted
between humans and initiate a pandemic. Scientists think
that the 1918 influenza pandemic virus was a result of
antigenic drift while the 1957–1958 and 1968–1969
influenza pandemic virus was a result of antigenic shift
[5].
Avian Influenza
The influenza virus has been in existence for centuries and
has been constantly infecting both humans and animals
(including birds). The avian influenza (AI) virus (also
called avian flu or bird flu virus) is a subtype that causes
contagious respiratory disease mainly in birds [6]. Wild
waterfowls, especially ducks, are natural reservoirs and
can carry the virus without manifesting symptoms of the
disease and spread the virus over great distances. Domes-
ticated poultry are also susceptible to avian flu and can
cause varying symptoms ranging from reduced egg pro-
duction to rapid death. The severe form of the disease is
called "highly pathogenic avian influenza" (sometimes
abbreviated as HPAI) and is associated with near 100%
mortality rates among domesticated birds. AI has become
endemic in several parts of Asia and it is believed that this
is a result of unregulated poultry rearing practices in rural
areas of developing countries. This is of concern because
such birds often live in close proximity to humans and
this increases the chance of genetic re-assortment between
avian and human influenza viruses which may produce a
mutant strain that is easily transmitted between humans
[7,8].
In the past, avian influenza viruses have rarely caused
severe disease in humans. However, in Hong Kong during
1997, a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza of
H5N1 subtype crossed from birds to humans who were in
direct contact with diseased birds during an avian influ-
enza outbreak among poultry. The cross-infection was
confirmed by molecular studies which showed that the
genetic makeup of the virus in humans were identical to
those found in poultry. The H5N1 virus caused severe ill-
ness and high mortality among humans: among 18 per-
sons who were infected, 6 died. The outbreak ended after
authorities slaughtered Hong Kong's entire stock of 1.5
million poultry. Since then, AI among birds has been
reported all over the world [9] and one of the factors
responsible for the spread is the trans-oceanic and trans-
continental migration of wild birds [10]. Most deaths
from AI have occurred in Indonesia to date [11] and
nearly all of the human cases resulted from close contact
with infected birds [12]. However, there has been a
reported cluster of plausible human-to-human transmis-
sion of the H5N1 virus within an extended family in the
village of Kubu Sembelang in north Sumatra, Indonesia,
in May 2006 [13].
Strains of influenza virus are classified into subtypes by
their protein coat antigens, namely haemagglutin (HA)
and neuramidase (NA). Of the 15 HA subtypes known,
H1, H2 and H3 are known to have circulated among
humans in the past century and hence, most people have
gained immunity to interrupt the transmission of the
virus. However, the H5N1 strain is unfamiliar to most
humans and our low herd immunity to it poses a pan-
demic threat. There are thought to be three pre-requisites
for a viral pandemic to occur: (1) the infectious strain is a
new virus subtype which the population has little or no
herd immunity; (2) the virus is able to replicate and cause
serious illness and (3) the virus has the ability to be trans-
mitted efficiently from human to human. The H5N1 virus
satisfies the first two pre-requisites of a pandemic but has
not developed the ability to be transmitted easily from
human to human, yet.
Lessons from the SARS Outbreak
The recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
virus outbreak in Asia saw another type of virus called the
coronavirus spread widely in a short time. However, the
SARS outbreak is considered to be "minor" when com-
pared to the 1918–1919 influenza outbreak because less
than 800 persons died from SARS worldwide whereas 40
to 50 million people died worldwide in the 1918 influ-
enza pandemic [14]. However, the rapid spread of SARS to
Asia, Australia, Europe and North America during the first
two quarters of 2003 illustrates the speed that an AI pan-
demic can spread across the world. The major reason why
SARS was quickly contained was that people with SARS
were not contagious before the onset of case-defining
symptoms which allowed effective control measures
based on case-identification [15]. However, a person with
influenza infection is contagious before the onset of case-Asia Pacific Family Medicine 2008, 7:5 http://www.apfmj.com/content/7/1/5
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defining symptoms, which limits the effectiveness of iso-
lation of cases as a control strategy for this illness [16].
The Feasibility of Early Containment Measures
The endemic nature of the avian flu among domestic birds
and their close co-existence with humans in rural areas of
Asia makes this part of world a likely epicenter of an AI
pandemic. Two international teams of researchers used
computer modeling to simulate what may happen if avian
flu were to start being transmitted efficiently between peo-
ple in Southeast Asia [17,18]. Both groups showed that a
carefully selected and orchestrated combination of public
health measures could potentially stop the spread of an
avian flu pandemic if implemented soon after the first
cases appear. Interventional strategies simulated include
an international stockpile to 3 million courses of flu anti-
viral drugs, treating infected individuals and everyone in
their social networks, closure of schools and workplaces,
vaccinating (even with a low-efficacy vaccine) half the
population before the start of a pandemic and quarantine
measures. Targeted anti-viral treatment was a crucial com-
ponent of all combined strategies and increasing public
health measures needed to be greatly increased as the
virus became more contagious. While the researchers said
that implementing such a combination of approaches was
challenging because it required a coordinated interna-
tional response, the models did show that containing an
avian flu pandemic at its source was theoretically feasible.
Strategies to Contain and Cope with an Avian Flu 
Pandemic
To successfully contain and control an AI pandemic, both
national and global strategies are needed [19]. National
strategies need multi-pronged approaches and involve
source surveillance and control, adequate stockpiles of
anti-viral agents, timely production of flu vaccines and
healthcare system readiness.
Source Surveillance and Control
When the H5N1 flu virus becomes easily transmissible
from human to human, the earlier this fact is known, the
more time there will be to gather and deploy available
public health resources. Currently, the World Health
Organisation (WHO), United Nations and other interna-
tional agencies are trying to contain the H5N1 epidemic
among poultry flocks in Asia and have set up monitoring
systems to detect new outbreaks (especially human-to-
human cases) early.
Flu Vaccines
Currently, there are ongoing efforts to mass produce and
stockpile vaccines against the H5N1 strain. Recent models
built on data from the 1918 flu pandemic predict that 50
million-80 million people could die and the overwhelm-
ing majority of deaths are likely to occur in the developing
countries. Unfortunately, total global capacity for flu vac-
cine manufacture in the first 12 months is estimated at
only 500 million doses. Moreover, flu vaccine production
faces many constraints: the vaccine is cultured in eggs and
this is a lengthy process which cannot be speeded up [20].
Fortunately, alternative sources of virus culture cells are
being investigated. With avian flu affecting poultry and
eggs, the egg supply required for vaccine production may
itself be disrupted. Intellectual property rights and liabil-
ity from adverse effects from vaccines are other issues that
impede manufacturers from increasing vaccine produc-
tion. It should also be noted that if the influenza pan-
demic strain turns out not to be the H5N1 variety, then
the stockpiled vaccines would be useless and wasted.
Deciding who to vaccinate is another challenge. Cur-
rently, influenza vaccination is recommended to the eld-
erly and those with medical conditions which put them at
higher risk for hospitalization and death if they become
infected with influenza. However, some critics have
argued that younger and healthier individuals should be
given priority because they are more mobile than older,
less healthy people and are therefore more likely to spread
the flu to others. Another factor in favour of giving priority
to younger people is that the seasonal flu vaccine pro-
duces a weaker immune response in the elderly. Moreo-
ver, if the flu pandemic has characteristics of the 1918–
1919 pandemic, then the young and healthy are at higher
risk of death. Even if supplies were adequate for all age
groups, mass immunization for a potential pandemic still
has its risks. In 1976, four US soldiers developed swine flu
in an army camp and there was concern that it could
become a pandemic like the 1918 Spanish flu. Although
some health officials expressed doubts about the likeli-
hood of an epidemic, the government initiated a mass
inoculation programme for the entire US population.
After hundreds of people receiving the vaccine came down
with Guillian-Barre syndrome, the US government termi-
nated the campaign and indemnified manufacturers, ulti-
mately paying $93 million in claims [21].
There is a light at the end of the tunnel. The WHO recently
announced plans to stockpile H5 influenza vaccine and
create a policy framework for vaccine allocation and rec-
ommendations for its use [22]. Several recent develop-
ments in H5 vaccines have made this stockpile feasible:
the development of H5N1 vaccines with adjuvants that
reduce the required dose as much as fourfold [23] and the
finding that adjuvant-enhanced vaccines may provide
cross-protection against strains that have undergone up to
seven years of genetic drift [24]. Furthermore, the manu-
facturing capacity of 500 million doses is calculated on a
requirement for three strains of flu virus for standard vac-
cinations; in crisis mode, three times as much monovalent
pandemic flu vaccine could be produced.Asia Pacific Family Medicine 2008, 7:5 http://www.apfmj.com/content/7/1/5
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Antiviral Drugs
Anti-viral drugs are thought to be backbone of a manage-
ment plan of an avian flu pandemic [25]. Only two anti-
viral drugs have shown promise in treating avian influ-
enza: oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (Relenza®). A
treatment of Tamiflu® includes 10 pills taken over five
days while Relenza® is administered by oral inhalation.
The US Food and Drug Administration has approved both
anti-viral drugs for treating influenza but only Tamiflu®
has been approved to prevent influenza infection. Because
antivirals can be stored without refrigeration and for
longer periods than vaccines, developing a stockpile of
antivirals has advantages as part of an overall strategy to
control a flu epidemic. However, there are limitations to
the use of antivirals: Tamiflu® needs to be taken within 2
days of initial flu symptoms for it to be effective, but many
people may not be aware that they have the flu early in the
disease. Some research in animals and recent experience
in the use of the drug to treat human cases have also found
that Tamiflu may be less effective against the recent strains
for the current H5N1 virus than the 1997 strain [26].
Improper compliance to antivirals by irresponsible indi-
viduals during an outbreak may results in the emergence
of a drug-resistant strain. Lastly, there are current concerns
about the safety of Tamiflu® which has been associated
with increased psychiatric symptoms among Japanese
adolescents [27].
Healthcare System Readiness
Every country's healthcare system would be stretched to
the limit in the event of a global pandemic of bird flu. The
ability of healthcare facilities to maintain strict infection
control measures would be challenged. The sudden surge
in health manpower and facility need would be acutely
felt among healthcare workers, epidemiologists and labo-
ratory technicians. Countries must set up AI pandemic
contingency plans and high-level coordinating commit-
tees comprising of representatives from multiple minis-
tries and agencies.
International Strategies
An avian flu that is easily transmissible between humans
would spread rapidly all over the world. The economic
cost of an avian pandemic to all countries would be phe-
nomenal and, if allowed to last for months, become expo-
nential [28-30]. Early detection and control of an AI
pandemic will also require a coordinated international
response. Controlling avian flu is for the good of global
public health and all countries have an interest and obli-
gation to do so. Firstly, the response to the influenza
threat would need an integrated cross-sector approach,
bringing together animal and human health, areas of rural
development and agriculture, economics, finance, plan-
ning and others. Partnerships are needed at both interna-
tional and national levels. Next, there is certainly a
priority on curbing the disease "at source" in the agricul-
tural sector, thereby reducing the probability of a human
epidemic. International resources are also needed for sur-
veillance on avian influenza outbreaks and human-to-
human transmission. It is also important to strike a bal-
ance between short and long term measures. Avian flu is
becoming endemic in parts of East Asia and will require a
long effort to suppress it. Meanwhile, a human pandemic
may still emerge from a different strain of flu virus. Thus
it makes sense for the international community to also
undertake broader long-term measures to strengthen the
institutional, regulatory and technical capacity of the ani-
mal health, human health and other relevant sectors in
Asia. While country-level preparedness and leadership is
essential for success, it must be backed by global
resources. Even though the benefits of containing a pan-
demic are overwhelming, individual governments may
still be daunted by the social, political and economic costs
of various policy measures. Richer countries may have to
support poorer countries in financial and non-financial
means in the fight against a flu pandemic, for the sake of
international good. The Global Outbreak Alert &
Response Network (GOARN), a technical collaboration of
existing institutions and networks who pool human and
technical resources for the rapid identification, confirma-
tion and response to disease outbreaks, is one such inter-
national body that supports global preparedness against
bird flu. However, for such an organization to succeed,
open communication and international cooperation is
essential. Lastly, there is a critical need to share informa-
tion rapidly with experts, policymakers and the world-
wide community at large. Honest public communication
will be critical as evidenced by China's denial of a local
SARS outbreak initially which delayed early containment
measures.
Recently, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Pas-
teur Institute and the Wellcome Trust, began planning,
with major medical-research funders and other stakehold-
ers, several projects to enhance the research effort and
reduce the risks from the threat of pandemic influenza
over coming decades [22]. In the next few years, they plan
to develop, maintain and disseminate a central inventory
of funded research activities that are relevant to human
influenza to ensure that stakeholders are well-informed.
They will also coordinate road-mapping exercises to iden-
tify knowledge gaps to assist funders and researchers in
establishing research-funding priorities, with specific
focus on vaccines, drug therapies and epidemiology/pop-
ulation science (for example, diagnostics, surveillance,
transmission and modelling), in the hope of developing a
cohesive health-research agenda for pandemic influenza.Asia Pacific Family Medicine 2008, 7:5 http://www.apfmj.com/content/7/1/5
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Conclusion
In the words of the late Director General of World Health
Organization, Dr Lee Jong Wook, '"it is only a matter of
time before an avian flu virus acquires the ability to be
transmitted from human to human, sparking the out-
break of human pandemic influenza...we don't know
when this will happen but we do know that it will hap-
pen"[31]. Factors that suggest that an AI pandemic would
be less severe than past influenza pandemics include
advances in medicine such as the availability of antiviral
medications and vaccines, and international surveillance
systems. However, there are also factors that suggest than
an avian influenza pandemic could be worse than the
1918 pandemic, such as a more densely populated world,
a larger immunocompromised population of elderly and
AIDS patients, and faster air travel and interconnections
between countries and continents which will accelerate
the spread of disease. Nevertheless, unlike the past, we
have the prior knowledge of a possible impending pan-
demic and the knowledge of how to contain and control
it. Preparedness, vigilance and cooperation, on local,
national and international levels, are our best weapons
against a deadly bird flu pandemic.
Summary of Implications for GPs
Currently, the H5N1 avian flu virus is limited to outbreaks
among poultry and persons in direct contact to infected
poultry. Avian influenza (AI) is endemic in Asia where
birds often live in close proximity to humans. This
increases the chance of genetic re-assortment between
avian and human influenza viruses which may produce a
mutant strain that is easily transmitted between humans,
resulting in a pandemic. Unlike SARS, a person with influ-
enza infection is contagious before the onset of case-
defining symptoms. Researchers have shown that care-
fully orchestrated of public health measures could poten-
tially limit the spread of an AI pandemic if implemented
soon after the first cases appear. Both national and inter-
national strategies are needed: National strategies include
source surveillance and control, adequate anti-viral agents
and vaccines, and healthcare system readiness; interna-
tional strategies include early integrated response, curbing
disease outbreak at source, utilization of global resources,
continuing research and open communication.
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